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Abstract 
LDCs' trade patterns changed in the past decade, thanks to the rebalancing of global demand 
towards large emerging countries and the resulting cycle of high international commodity 
prices. This process led to a wider geographical diversification of LDCs' exports but 
contributed also to a greater reliance on those highly priced commodities. Notwithstanding 
some progress in market and product diversification — including services — LDCs remain 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks.  With the exception of 2006-2008, the LDCs as a 
group have systematically recorded a trade deficit.  The 2008-2009 global crisis and the 
bumpy recovery which followed illustrate the volatility of the recent trends. In such a 
perspective, renewed efforts towards extensive product diversification are called for. 
Fostering diversification has been supported for many years by preferential market access to 
developed countries; more recently, emerging countries have also been granting such 
preferences to LDCs products. Preferential market access remains relevant, but is not 
sufficient to improve the supply-side capabilities. The new business model related to global 
value chains (GVC) offers new opportunities to LDCs for export diversification. But GVC 
participation cannot materialize without a proper trade environment. Some of the main 
obstacles for joining GVCs are the high transaction costs in importing the necessary inputs 
and exporting the processed goods. Active trade facilitation programmes, such as those 
identified during the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade in July 2013 offer new options to 
LDCs for joining GVCs. For those LDCs that have already been able to join these global 
production network, up-grading towards higher "value-added" activities requires more 
encompassing horizontal policies. 
Key words: Least developed countries, trade and development, 2008-2009 global crisis, 
preferential market access, global value chains, trade facilitation. 
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Trade Collapse: Patterns and Stylized Facts 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Least developed countries do form a specific group within the World Trade Organization. For 
belonging to the poorest countries in the world, they are natural beneficiaries of the special and 
differential treatments (S&D) in terms of market access. The Hong-Kong ministerial declaration 
called for developed countries to grant an extended Duty Free Quota Free treatment, and the level 
of preferences granted by advanced economies to this group of developing countries is closely 
monitored by the UN as part of the Millennium Development Goals. More recently, a growing 
number of emerging economies started to grant preferential market access to countries belonging 
to this group. For similar reasons, the LDCs are also a test case on the role of trade in promoting 
development, and more specifically, the contribution of S&Ds in fostering trade at the extensive 
and intensive margins. With respect to the latter, LDC as a group is known as being very 
dependent on the exports of a few primary commodities basically fuels and minerals.  
Dependency on natural resources exports is usually seen as a curse for a number of reasons (from 
Prebish's hypothesis of long-term declining terms of trade to the high volatility of trade receipts 
and the Dutch Disease appreciating real exchange rates). Nevertheless, this dependency proved to 
be a blessing during the commodity super-cycle which coincided with the rapid emergence of large 
Asian developing countries, in particular China. During most of the 2000s, terms of trade became 
neatly in favour of commodity exporters, with the international price of most commodities rising 
while the price of manufacturing remained almost flat. As a result, the LDC group, known for its 
structural trade deficit, registered a trade surplus after 2005. 
Obviously, the bonanza did not benefit all LDCs, and some of them suffered particularly from the 
higher cost of their imports of basic commodities, in particular fuels and foodstuff. Moreover, the 
global crisis which started in 2008 and the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009 put the super-cycle 
to a test. The trade surplus reverted to a deficit and the slow-down of the Chinese economy after 
2012 casts a shadow on the sustainability of the high-growth pattern registered by LDCs trade in 
the 2000s.  
The objectives of the paper are, in a first part, to review these trends, provide a series of stylised 
facts to better understand them while highlighting, when relevant, the heterogeneity of the LDC 
group. After this review of structural trend, the second part will look at the 2008-2009 Great Trade 
Collapse and its short-term dynamics. A third section will look more into the future prospects, in 
particular in relation with the possibility of LDCs of inserting themselves into the new currents of 
trade created by global value chains. A conclusion summarizes the main results.  
A few words of caution are called for at this stage. Most of the analysis is done from the LDC group 
perspective; this should not minimize the fact there is a large array of individual country's 
characteristics that make this group quite a heterogeneous one. If we follow some indicators, such 
as trade balances, this heterogeneity may even have increased in the most recent years. While we 
are well aware of this reality, an in-depth analysis of the specificities within the LDC group would 
nevertheless require a more comprehensive review which is beyond the ambition of this paper.  
2  The LDCs and the world markets: trends in trade and preferential market 
access   
The denomination of Least Developed Country (LDC) was defined by the United Nations in 1971. 
The classification decision rests with the Committee for Development Policy (CDP), a subsidiary 
body of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The CDP uses a set of formal criteria for 
identifying countries as LDCs; the initial (1971) criteria for designating a country as least 
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developed required a low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and structural impediments to 
growth. The criteria have been refined over the years to take into account new insights, without 
diverging much from the initial ideas. Even though LDCs share similar characteristics for these 
main basic indicators, their structural, economic and socio-economic characteristics can be very 
heterogeneous (see Annex). Therefore, the identification of stylized facts and trends for the group 
may hide substantive country-to-country variations.  
By and large, LDCs are small countries from a trade perspective and should be analyzed as "price 
and trend" takers. 1 Because of structural supply constraints that limit the possibility of diversifying 
into new products, their exports depend greatly on the overall orientation of the world economy 
and the evolution of the international prices of primary commodities at the intensive margin. 
Diversification at the extensive margin is also important, both quantitatively (geographical 
diversification of traditional exports) and qualitatively (diversification into new product lines, 
including services). 
 
2.1   World trade and markets 
If LDCs flow with the tide, the seas were particularly favourable during most of the 2000s. World 
trade in goods and services grew at an impressive rate, accelerating its long-term trend in the new 
millennium. Indeed, world trade surged by 2.5 times in the seven years that followed the 2001 
dip. The average annual growth rate for 2000-2008 reached 12.2%, against an average of 8% for 
the entire 1980-2008 period.   
Chart 1: World trade in goods and services, 1980-2012 
(Billion dollars) 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
A large part of the 2000s success story is due to the super-cycle of commodities. While the price of 
commodities during the 1980s and 1990s did follow the declining trend predicted by development 
economists that followed Prebish and Singer; the average annual growth rate of LDCs' exports of 
fuels and minerals jumped to 19.5% in the 2000s as a result of both stronger demand and higher 
prices.2 Meanwhile, trade in manufactures lagged behind, even though it accelerated to 10.5%. 
                                               
1 They weigh about 1% of world trade, even if some LDCs have significant world market shares on a few 
rare natural resources or may have been able to build a niche in some light manufacture such as clothing.   
2 The Prebisch–Singer hypothesis postulates that the barter terms of trade between primary products 
and manufactured goods deteriorate in time (see Ocampo and Parra, 2003); to avoid regressive specialization 
in low-price and low demand elasticity primary products, R. Prebish advocated fostering manufacturing 
capacities in developing countries through an import-substitution policy.  
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The rapid growth of trade in commodities in the 2000s was basically a story of rising prices, first of 
fuels and minerals, then of agricultural products. The price of manufactures, meanwhile, exhibited 
a more gradual and modest growth throughout the three decades. 
Chart 2: Export prices of goods, 1980-2012 
(Indices 1980 = 100) 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
In volume terms, world trade in manufactured goods expanded by an annual average of 6% 
during the 1980-1999 period; much faster than those of trade in commodities which grew by 
about 2.5%. With the generalization of global manufacturing along international supply chains 
after 1995 and the concomitant emergence of large developing countries as manufacturers, prices 
of manufactured goods tended to remain in check while trade in intermediate goods (parts and 
components) was amplified. In the 2000s and up to the 2008 crisis, the volume of world trade in 
manufactured goods continued to grow by practically the same annual average rate of 6% of the 
80s and 90s; thus outpacing once again the corresponding growth of 4% and 3.2% registered for 
agricultural and fuels and mining products. 
Trade in services, a sector of particular relevance for many small LDCs, increased at a relatively 
faster pace than trade in goods during the 1980-2008 period. Other commercial services, the 
category most closely related to the outsourcing and offshoring of business services, 3 contributed 
the most to this growth from the mid-1990s and onwards. Both travel (a close indicator of tourism 
receipts) and transportation also enjoyed strong growth during the three decades, especially – as 
in so many sectors – in the decade leading up to the financial crisis. Albeit LDCs typically run a 
deficit in the services account, as a group they record a surplus in travel, reflecting the importance 
of in-bound tourism in their economies (ITC, 2013). Honeck (2012) points that, amongst the few 
LDCs that have graduated or are expected to do so, almost all have a strong tourist sector. 4  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 The category of "other commercial services" includes, inter alia, incomes for licenses and royalties, as 
well as transactions such as construction, computer and information, and other business services (legal, 
accounting, management and public relations services). These services are sometimes traded involving the 
presence of natural persons in the recipient countries (mode 4). 
4 To date there have been only three examples of successful graduation from LDC status: Botswana in 
1994, Cape Verde in 2007, and the Maldives in 2011. As Honeck (2012) signals, Cape Verde and the Maldives 
have tourism-based economies while Botswana has a significant tourism sector besides her diamond extractive 
activities. The author points also that the next LDC graduation is expected to be Samoa (in 2014), followed 
perhaps by Vanuatu or Bhutan and all those countries have relatively large tourism sectors. Indeed, too often 
services are overlooked as source of export diversification while their contribution to export diversification is 
significant, both quantitatively and qualitatively.   
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Chart 3: World trade in commercial services by sector, 1980-2012 
(Billion dollars) 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
As mentioned, this rise in world trade in the second half of the 1990s and during the 2000s was 
closely related to the emergence of global value chains and the delocalization of part of the 
manufacturing process from the North to the South. Thanks to this trend, a new middle class 
appeared in the emerging countries, which increased its demand for housing and consumption 
goods and services. The convergence of these supply and demand factors profoundly altered the 
geography of trade during the 2000s.  
Chart 4: Geographical distribution of world trade, 1980-2012 
(Percentage) 
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade database. 
 
The 2000s were clearly characterised by the growing share of South-South trade and the falling 
share of North-North trade. This reconfiguration is occurring in an increase of trade volume in both 
cases, id est, in a win-win situation for both North and South. Between 2000 and 2008, South-
South trade expanded by an annual average of 19%.  The share of South-South trade in world 
trade increased from 11% in 2000 to 18% in 2008. On the other hand, despite a 9% average 
annual growth, the share of North-North trade in world shrank from 50% in 2000 to 41% in 2008.  
Another indication of the increasingly greater role of developing countries in world trade is their 
rankings in the world’s largest trading economies. In 1990, six developing countries were among 
6 
 
the top 20. By 2008, their numbers had grown to eight and China became the second major 
exporter. 
2.2  Surfing on the tide: LDCs trends in market share  
LDC exports increased at an average annual rate of 21% between 2000 and 2008. This result is to 
be compared with 15% for all developing countries and 12% for the world. As a result of the rapid 
rates set in the 2000s, the share of LDC exports in the world surpassed the level in 1980 and was 
just shy of one per cent at the outset of the financial crisis. 
Chart 5: Share of LDC exports of goods and services in world exports, 1980-2012 
(Percentage) 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
To moderate the enthusiasm, it should be noted that most of this was due to the super-cycle and 
the high price of commodities: the return of LDCs on the international scene was almost entirely 
due to trade in goods, in particular commodities.5 This is reflected in the respective growth rates of 
the trade in goods. As services are a marker of mature industrial and post-industrial development, 
this shows that most LDCs are still far from having transited from the initial stages of 
industrialisation.  
But LDCs did more than just riding the tide, as they were able to increase their share in key 
markets. 6 Charts 6 and 7 depict the extent to which LDCs gained/lost market shares in dynamic 
products and dynamic markets between 2000 and 2008. During the super-cycle, LDCs have gained 
market shares in the world’s most dynamic sectors (fuels and minerals) and most dynamic 
markets (China and India). In view of this, it is not surprising that the overall market share of LDC 
exports rose during this period. A more elaborate shift-share analysis 7 leads to the same 
conclusion, with fuels and minerals accounting for more than three-quarters of the growth of LDC 
exports between 2000 and 2008. 
 
                                               
5 Two significant factors behind the trends have been (i) international prices of fuels and minerals and 
(ii) the investment in – as well as new discoveries of – extractive commodities.  In the second half of the 1980-
2008 period, the surging demand for raw materials – mainly from large emerging markets – spurred the 
growth in both these factors, with LDC exports of fuels and minerals increasing in terms of value as well as 
volume. 
6 See, for instance, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/46, pp. 11-14. 
7 A method used to identify the extent to which growth can be attributed to general global trends and to 
more distinctly national ones (such as improved competitiveness); see Piezas-Jerbi and Nee (2009). 
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Chart 6: Comparative evolution of LDCs' product specialization, 2000-2008 
(Annual average growth, %) 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
Chart 7: Comparative evolution of main LDC markets, 2000-2008 
(Annual average growth, %) 
 
 
Notes: the points above/below the 45° line are those for which LDCs have gained/lost market share; the size 
of the point indicates the importance of the corresponding market for LDCs (either as an exported product or a 
market of destination) during the period. 
Source: WTO Secretariat 
2.3  Net trade balance 
With the exception of a few years before the global crisis of 2008-2009, LDCs as a group have 
recorded trade deficits. This structural deficit, symptom of supply shortcomings, micro-economic 
inefficiencies and economic imbalances, is also a factor of increased vulnerability as export 
earnings tend to fluctuate while most imports of essential goods such as fuels or food are inelastic. 
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On the other hand, these deficits exist in the long-term only because they are financed from other 
external sources, such as official assistance or workers remittances. 
2.3.1  Trade balances by export specialization 
Table 1: LDCs merchandise trade balance by product groups, 2000-2012 
(Billion dollars) 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total merchandise -7.3 -11.1 -9.7 -14.1 -10.5 -4.7 2.9 3.6 6.0 -26.0 -7.0 -4.3 -18.4 
Agriculture  a -1.9 -2.3 -3.1 -4.1 -4.5 -5.3 -6.6 -9.3 -15.2 -14.4 -17.6 -23.4 -23.8 
Fuels 10.5 10.1 12.7 15.1 23.0 37.2 47.5 62.8 87.7 52.3 64.0 76.3 78.0 
Non-fuel minerals 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.6 3.3 6.6 8.0 10.0 7.8 13.2 16.4 16.4 
Manufactures -17.5 -18.9 -20.7 -25.0 -31.7 -39.3 -48.6 -59.3 -78.7 -74.8 -89.1 -107.9 -116.3 
 
Note: Trade balances for the respective product groups are estimated based on WTO network of world 
merchandise trade by products and regions and refer to FOB valuation on both export and import sides.  
These estimates do not add up to the total merchandise trade balances, which are calculated from official 
statistics as FOB-based exports minus CIF-based imports. 
a Includes forestry and fishery products. 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
As would be expected, in view of the product-specific trade balances, it was the fuel exporters that 
contributed the most to the positive trade balances of 2006-2008 (see Chart 8). As a matter of 
fact, the group of fuel exporting LDCs was the only one to post trade surpluses in the 2000s, 
although this was not the case for all countries within that group. Trade of mineral and 
manufactures exporters became somewhat balanced in the 2000-2008 period, albeit the groups 
incurring trade deficits towards the end of it. The remaining groups saw their trade balances 
become increasingly negative, with the largest trade deficits being among the agricultural 
exporters and exporters without a clear specialization. 
Chart 8: LDCs merchandise trade balance by export specialization, 1980-2012 
(Billion dollars) 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database. 
 
An insight into what has been behind these divergent trends is gained when separating the effects 
of two different components: prices and volumes. Such an analysis is presented in Table 2. There 
it can be seen that whereas most types of exporters enjoyed a similar export growth in terms of 
volume, they fared differently when it came to the evolution of the prices of their exports (defined 
as the average unit value of their total exports). The case of the imports of these countries, on the 
other hand, was the reverse: annual average rate of growth of volume varied significantly, while 
9 
 
prices rose at a more comparable rate. The corollary is that the evolution of the terms of trade – 
positive in the case of fuel and mineral exporters, negative for the rest – goes some way to explain 
the different trajectories. 
As a final note, it is worth pointing to the wide heterogeneities within the different groups in terms 
of the evolution of volume and prices of their traded goods, as indicated by the coefficient of 
variation in the table. 
Table 2: LDCs’ exports and imports: evolution of volume, unit value and value, 2000-
2012  
(Percentage) 
 
  Volume Unit Value Value 
  YoY 
variation 
a
 
Coef .of 
variation
 b
 
YoY 
variation
 a
 
Coef .of 
variation
 b
 
YoY 
variation
 a
 
Coef .of 
variation
 b
 
Exports        
LDC 8 31 10 44 16 59 
of which:        
Agricultural exporters 8 28 7 35 13 54 
Fuel exporters 7 31 12 50 17 63 
Mineral exporters 10 31 9 41 18 63 
Manufacture exporters 10 39 2 12 12 48 
Diversified and other exporters 5 15 8 34 10 38 
Imports        
LDC 10 38 6 26 15 54 
of which:        
Agricultural exporters 10 35 6 26 14 53 
Fuel exporters 13 46 5 21 17 58 
Mineral exporters 12 40 6 25 17 61 
Manufacture exporters 6 22 6 30 12 50 
Diversified and other exporters 4 18 7 31 11 42 
 
Notes: a Average annual rate of growth over the 2000-2012 period.  
 b Standard deviation divided by average variation. 
Source: WTO Secretariat, on the basis of deflators sourced from UNCTAD. 
 
LDCs typically run a deficit in the services account, but as a group they tend to record a surplus 
specifically in Travel, reflecting the importance of in-bound Tourism in their economies.  
 
2.3.2  Financing the gap: role of aid and worker remittances 
As was seen above, LDCs registered trade surpluses in 2006-2008, but from the perspective of the 
past three decades this was an exception to the rule. Moreover, these positive trade balances were 
due primarily to fuel exporting countries and, to a lesser extent, to mineral exporters. It is 
therefore of interest to examine the role of aid and worker remittances in the finance of imports. 
Although data is not available for all LDCs, Chart 9 indicates the importance of aid and worker 
remittances. Between 1980 and 1999, Official Development Assistance (ODA), remittance and FDI 
flows increased by an annual average of 1.8%, 7.4% and 13.4% respectively; while the 
corresponding growth figures for the years 2000 and 2011 were much higher at 12.6%, 14.1% 
and 16.1%. The crisis affected only FDI flows, which declined by 7% in 2009 and caught up the 
lost ground already in 2010 and continue to grow by a further 14% in 2011 thanks to inflows 
coming notably from emerging Asian economies. Albeit at relatively decelerated rates, both ODA 
and remittances continued to grow during the crisis.    
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Chart 9: External development finance to LDCs: 1980- 2011, selected flows 
(Million dollars) 
 
Notes: Partial coverage only; data on development assistance from private funds or official south-south 
partners are missing, as well as other flows of importance such as debt relief and budget support.  
Source: OECD DAC-CRS, World Bank and UNCTAD. 
 
Chart 10: Share of remittances to GDP in 2011, top ten LDCs 
(Percentage) 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Remittance receipts of LDCs had nearly doubled from US$3.5 billion in 1990 to US$6.3 billion in 
2000. Between 2000 and 2011, remittances quadrupled to US$27 billion.  The magnitude of ODA 
was twice that of remittances and three times of FDI in 2000. In 2011, however, ODA was only 
one and half times bigger than remittances and double that of FDI mainly due to budgetary 
constraints in the developed economies. However, official figures underestimate actual flows of 
remittances. According to the World Bank, if remittances sent through informal channels are 
included, total remittances could be as much as 50% higher than the official record (World Bank, 
2010). Remittance flows have offset large trade deficits in many countries like Bangladesh and 
Nepal and enabled these countries to maintain a current account surplus (Mohapatra, Ratha and 
Silwal, 2010).   
Moreover, they constitute a significant complement to domestic income, well over 10% in several 
cases (Chart 10). In addition to providing a supplement to household income, resources from 
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remittances have been directed to investments in infrastructure, education and health, among 
others (Varma, 2009).  
Besides its financial importance for balance of payments, FDI plays a fundamental role in 
transferring technology and skills to LDCs. 8 In 2011, at US$21 billion, FDI flows to the LDCs 
accounted for only 1.3% of global FDI flows according to UNCTAD statistics.   
 
2.4  Preferential Market Access  
LDCs have benefited from a series of preferential market access to developed countries, promoted 
under the “Enabling Clause” and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or resulting from 
bilateral or regional agreements. 9 More recently, South-South trade preferences were promoted 
with the establishment of the Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries 
(GSTP). In December 2005, the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong adopted a decision 
to extend LDCs' DFQF market access granted by developed countries to at least 97% of tariff lines. 
India became the first developing country Member to announce its intention to implement the 
decision in April 2008 and since then, a growing number of developing countries have also granted 
specific preferences to LDCs. 
The utilization and effectiveness of such preferences have been intensively debated in the 
development economics literature (see Hoekman and Ozden, 2005 for a review). In line with the 
general purpose of the paper, the following sections do not enter into the measurement debate but 
provide stylized facts about the implementation of these preferences and their utilization by LDCs. 
A thorough analysis of their impact would require factoring in trade related policies implemented 
by the LDCs themselves, such as trade facilitation, in addition to behind-the-border structural and 
supply-side domestic policies aiming at promoting non-traditional exports. Moreover, the section 
focuses on trade in goods. While services are labour intensive activities that present obvious 
advantages for developing economies with abundant work-force, trade restrictiveness in the case 
of services is not related to tariffs, but to a series of institutional, regulatory and administrative 
restrictions that are difficult to compile and compare.  
Information on market conditions directly relevant for LDCs exports of commercial services is scant 
and often anecdotal. In addition, the existing indicators are of little relevance for most LDCs, as 
they focus on the effect of domestic regulations on the establishment and operation of new firms 
in the domestic market, i.e. they are mostly relevant for exporters of services under mode 3 
(involving the presence of an affiliated firm in the market of destination).  Actually, mode 4 
(presence of natural persons supplying services) is probably more relevant (see WTO, 2007). The 
issue has been at the center of some complex negotiations due to non-economic considerations (in 
particular, immigration policy).  
 
2.4.1  Tariff policy and market access conditions facing LDC exports in developed 
countries 
LDC tariff policy is usually characterised by high bound and applied tariffs, and incomplete binding. 
As shown in Diakantoni and Escaith (2009), LDCs tend to apply high duties (with some exceptions) 
and do not always benefit from high margins in the binding overhang (difference between bound 
and applied tariffs).  
 
                                               
8 In general, FDI to the LDCs takes mainly the form of greenfield projects rather than resulting from 
merger and acquisition between established firms.   
9 Among the specific LDC schemes are Canada’s Least Developed Country Tariff (LDCT) and the EU’s 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiatives. In addition, LDCs and other developing countries have benefited from 
regional preferential schemes, such as the EU’s arrangement for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
and the US’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).   
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Table 3: Average tariff profile of LDC countries, 2011 
(Percentage) 
 
Applied MFN Tariff a Binding Coverage b  Average Bound Tariff a 
Total Agriculture Other 
products 
Total Non-
Agriculture 
Total Agriculture Other products 
11.7 14.8 11.3 59.3 53.2 59.9 73.7 42.6 
Notes: a: ad valorem and equivalent, simple average of countries' tariffs. 
b: percentage of tariff lines. 
Source: Based on World Tariff Profile 2012, ITC-UNCTAD-WTO  
 
With respect to services, the difference between the existing (or applied, using the term used in 
tariff) LDC trade openness in services and their GATS (binding) commitments is now quite wide 
according to Gootiiz and Matoo (2009) and Honeck (2012). In order to attract FDI, many LDCs 
have already fully opened a wide range of services sectors. As seen in Chart  11, the number of 
existing GATS commitments varies widely among the LDCs by subsector, ranging from over 110 
(Gambia and Sierra Leone) to only 1 or 2 sub-sectors (Burkina Faso, Chad, Madagascar, Mali and 
Tanzania). 
Chart 11: LDCs GATS Commitments, 2012 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
In terms of market access conditions for their exports, LDCs benefit from lower tariff duties for 
their merchandise exports, either because they tend to export on tariff lines with low MFN tariff 
(fuels and minerals) or thanks to preferential schemes.  As shown in Table 4, the situation varies 
according to the markets of destination (developed vs. developing economies) and the type of 
exported products. On agricultural products, the average margin of preference over MFN treatment 
(6 percentage points) granted to LDCs exports is similar for both developed and developing 
countries. Nonetheless, the resulting best tariff remains much higher when the products are 
shipped to other developing countries (7.6%) rather than industrialised ones (2.2%). On non-
agricultural products, exports to other developing countries benefit from very low margin of 
preference, yet the best tariff applied is lower (1.1%) than for exports to developed countries 
(2.3%).  
 
This paradox is explained by the different composition of products. True preferential treatment, 
discounting tariff lines that are not dutiable under MFN, is considerably lower for exports to 
developing countries as only few emerging countries have operative preferences in place.  Low 
applied duties on South-South trade results from trade being largely dominated by export of 
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primary commodities (fuels and minerals) that have a very low MFN tariff while South-North 
exports are more concentrated on those processed goods and other manufactures that benefit 
from higher preference margin (4.2 percentage points). 
 
Table 4: Exports of LDCs to developed and developing markets, per sector and duties 
faced, 2011 or closest year  
(Million dollars and percentage) 
 
Market of 
destination  
 Sector Trade 
value 
($mn) 
MFN 
tariff average a 
Preference Best 
tariff 
Duty Free 
Imports 
    Simple Weighted   % of 
TL 
% of 
Value 
Developed 
countries 
Agriculture 3,467  51.0 8.2 6.0 2.2 99.6 98.6 
 Other 45,503  5.3 6.4 4.2 2.3 90.9 86.1 
Developing 
countries 
Agriculture 4,069  15.4 13.5 5.9 7.6 54.5 61.8 
 Other 65,310  8.6 1.6 0.6 1.1 56.3 81.1 
 
Notes: a Traded tariff lines only. 
Source: Based on World Tariff Profile 2012, ITC-UNCTAD-WTO  
 
Information on preferential market access for LDCs exports of commercial services is scant. Up to 
early 2013, no waiver preferences have been granted under the WTO LDC services waiver (WTO, 
2013a). For this reason, the remaining part of this section will concentrate on trade in goods, 
differentiating between preferential market accesses in developed and in developing countries.  
2.4.2  LDCs' market access to developed countries 
Market access to developed economies is monitored by comparing the situation of LDCs with the 
larger group of developing countries, as the latter group tends to compete more directly on similar 
market niches (agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, light manufacture). Two indicators 
are analysed: duty free quota free (DFQF) imports and average applied tariffs on selected 
products. These two indicators are those used to monitor the Market Access targets 8.6 and 8.7 of 
the Millennium Development Goals.   
At first glance, LDCs suffered from preference erosion as the other developing countries are 
enjoying almost similar DFQF access (Chart 12). But the situation when it comes to “true 
preference” (ie, DFQF on MFN dutiable products) is very different. Most LDCs enjoy a truly DFQF 
preferential access, and this share has been increasing with time: 53% of preferential DFQF 
exports in 2011, against 35% in 2000 (Table 5). In contrast, most of the improvements recorded 
for other developing countries in general were due to elimination of tariffs under MFN treatment; 
in this case, there is no particular preference with respect to other trade partners. In 2011, out of 
the 80% of non-dutiable exports from developing countries, only 20% corresponded to true 
preferential access.    
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Chart 12: Share of imports from least-developed and developing countries entering 
duty-free in Developed Countries 
(Percentage) 
 
50.0%
55.0%
60.0%
65.0%
70.0%
75.0%
80.0%
85.0%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Developing countries LDCs
 
Note: The evolution of the indicator is affected by changes in the composition of trade.  
Source: Based on data jointly compiled by ITC, UNCTAD and WTO. 
 
 
Table 5: Proportion of developed-country imports from developing and least developed 
countries admitted free of duty, by value, 1996-2011  
(Percentage) 
 
 1996 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
   Total Duty Free (excluding oil and arms) 
Developing countries a  54.3 64.8 74.9 76.2 77.4 78.7 77 78.8 79.7 
 - Least Developed Countries  77.6 69.8 80.4 79.1 79.8 80.6 80.4 80.4 83.4 
   Of which: True Duty Free b 
Developing countries a  19.6 17 21.5 20.9 20 20 20.1 19.6 20.3 
 - Least Developed Countries  34.9 35 49 52.7 51.9 48.7 52.9 53.6 52.7 
Notes: a Including LDCs. 
 b The true duty free portion is calculated by subtracting from the total duty-free access all products 
receiving duty free treatment under the MFN regime. The indicators are based on the best available 
treatment, including regional and preferential agreements. 
Source:  WTO-ITC-UNCTAD. 
From a development perspective, preferences are particularly important to foster export 
diversification, in particular in products intensive in labour. Average tariffs levied on labour 
intensive products exported by LDCs declined significantly after the Uruguay Round in 1995 and 
the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005. Thanks to preferential schemes and 
multilateral agreements such as the ITA, tariffs have been almost entirely removed on light 
manufactures (with exceptions for textiles and clothing) or are very low, as in agriculture (Table 
6). Average tariffs remain relatively high in the case of textiles and clothing which reflects the 
exclusion of large Asian LDC exporters from US preferential tariff on the basis of "competitive-need 
limitations".  10 
                                               
10 The evolution of market access used to monitor market access is based on a fixed export structure in 
order to capture only the change in tariff duties and control for fluctuations in product composition. 
15 
 
With the exception of agriculture, LDCs have suffered from preference erosion when comparing 
their situation with the treatment granted by developed economies to all developing countries in 
general.  While the margin stands at about 6 percentage points for agriculture, it has been reduced 
to low or almost inexistent levels for textiles and clothing and other industries (between 1.7 and 
0.6 percentage point).  
The issue of preference erosion is also present in the context of multilateral trade negotiation 
leading to a reduction of MFN tariffs. In the context of the Doha Round, Low et al (2005) find that 
almost all LDCs do not gain nor lose from MFN trade liberalization in non-agricultural (NAMA) 
products because their exports are dominated by fuels and minerals, products that are already 
largely MFN duty free. The main sectors where preference erosion occurs are textiles, fish and fish 
products, leather and leather products, electrical machinery,  wood and wood products. Similarly, 
Low et al. (2006) find that the risk of preference erosion for agricultural exports in the QUAD 
markets is small. As a group, the LDCs would even register some moderate gains. Nevertheless, a 
few countries would be negatively affected, according to their product and geographical 
specialization. The most affected products are bananas, sugar, beverages and spirits; and much of 
the impact occurs in the EU market (Low, Patrick, Roberta Piermartini and Jürgen Richtering 
(2005-2006)).  
Table 6: Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on key products exported by 
Least-developed and developing countries, 1996-2011 
(Percentage ad valorem) a 
  Developing countries b 
  1996 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Agriculture 10.4 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.3 8 7.8 7.3 7.2 
Clothing 11.5 10.8 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.1 8 7.9 
Textile 7.3 6.6 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 5 4.9 
Other industries 2.0 1.4 1.1 1.1 1 1 0.9 0.9 0.8 
  Least Developed Countries 
  1996 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Agriculture 3.8 3.6 3 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.2 1 1 
Clothing 8.2 7.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.7 
Textile 4.6 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Other industries 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Notes:  a: Average tariffs are based on best applicable tariffs (MFN and preferential treatments granted to LDCs 
and developing countries), and weighted using a standard export structure based on 2000-2001 data, to limit 
the impact of the year-to-year changes in export composition and relative prices on the indicators. 
  b: Includes LDCs. 
Source: WTO-ITC-UNCTAD. 
 
The difference in preference margin between groups results from two main reasons, according to 
WTO (2012): (i) some products in the same broad category may be less taxed than others (e.g., 
tropical fruits vs. dairy products) on the importing market, irrespective of the preferential status of 
the exporter, and (ii) some exporting countries may benefit from more preferences than others. 
The heterogeneity of individual situations appears when disaggregating by sub-regional groupings.  
In 2010, the average tariffs faced by small island LDC products imported by developed countries 
were the lowest ( close to zero for agriculture) , higher (for clothing (5.5%) and textiles (7%)) in 
the case of Pacific Islands; while Haiti's exports benefited from almost complete duty free 
treatment. African LDCs benefited also from the best treatments on average (less than 2% for 
agriculture, 2.6% for textile and 3.6% for clothing). Asian LDCs confronted higher tariffs in 
general, at about 3% for agriculture, 2.6% for textiles, and 6.7% for clothing (WTO, 2012).  
 
2.4.3  LDCs' market access to developing countries 
Recent trends reveal the increasing importance of developing countries' demand as source of 
growth for international trade. Growth in South-South exports has generally exceeded that of 
world trade over the past 15 years. With this strong trend, South-South trade share in total world 
trade climbed from less than 10% in 1990 to 22% in 2012. As a result, the issue of market access 
to developing countries is of growing importance for the LDCs. Under the Global System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP), some developing countries provide duty free access to a limited number of 
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products from LDCs. These preferences are complemented by a series of bilateral or multilateral 
preferential market access, as well as a few non-reciprocal preferential schemes.    
Up to 2010, preference granted by developing countries to LDCs was rather limited and concerned 
mainly clothing. Latest data for 2011 point to a change in this situation, with a deepening of 
preferences granted to apparels (11 percentage points over a theoretical MFN tariff of 19%) but 
also some preferences being granted to textiles (about 5 percentage points). In a weighted 
average of all products, excepting oil, the preference margin granted to LDCs by a group of 
selected developing countries is 2.4%. When looking at individual import markets, China and 
South Africa are the two countries that have been the most active in granting preferences; the 
weight of China as the largest market of destination for LDCs' exports explains a large proportion 
of the evolution of the indicators.  
Table 7: Average tariffs imposed by selected developing countries on key products from 
least developed countries, 2001-2011 
(Percentage ad valorem)  
 
Products 
 
Tariff and preference 
(weighted average) a 
2001 2006 2011 
Agriculture MFN 31.9 21.4 21.2 
 Best applicable 31.2 20.5 18.6 
 Average margin 0.7 0.9 2.6 
Other raw material b MFN 5.3 2.8 2.6 
 Best applicable 5.2 2.7 1.5 
 Average margin 0.1 0.1 1.0 
Clothing MFN 19.4 18.4 19.1 
 Best applicable 18.9 15.9 8.1 
 Average margin 0.4 2.6 11.0 
Textile MFN 12.7 9.3 9.4 
 Best applicable 12.5 8.6 4.1 
 Average margin 0.2 0.7 5.3 
Other Industrial MFN 5.1 4.1 3.6 
 Best applicable 4.8 3.8 1.6 
 Average margin 0.3 0.3 2.0 
Total b MFN 11.9 8.3 8.1 
 Best applicable 11.6 7.8 5.6 
 Average margin 0.3 0.5 2.4 
 
Notes:  a: Average applied tariffs are based on best applicable tariffs (MFN and preferential treatments granted 
by a group of 12 developing countries to LDCs), and weighted using a standard export structure based on 
2009-2011 data.  
 b: Excluding oil.  
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
2.4.4  Operationalizing market access preferences 
All the above mentioned indicators based on best applicable tariffs are established on the 
hypothesis that available preferences are fully used. This may not be the case for a number of 
reasons; ranging from ineligibility due to non-conformity to some other criteria (for example, rules 
of origin or non-tariff measures) or excessive administrative cost. The specificity, design and 
application of rules of origin can make it difficult for LDC exporters to benefit from preference 
schemes. Strict rules of origin (or regional cumulation) were justified on the ground that they help 
in promoting integrated production structure in the recipient country. This aim is now increasingly 
questioned as manufacture production is increasingly performed in the context of global industrial 
networks (Zedillo et al, 2005).  This is a particular problem in textiles and apparel, which are key 
exports for LDCs. Looking at agriculture, Bureau et al. (2006) find that the overall rate of 
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utilization for non-reciprocal preferences is high in the case of the EU and the USA (89% and 87%) 
thanks, in part, to the various options offered to exporters that allow avoiding the most demanding 
schemes. When exporters to the EU or the US have the choice, they favour Cotonou in the case of 
EU, or CBERA in the case of the US. Considering that tariffs are not a variable in this case, Bureau, 
Chakir and Gallezot (2006) infer that administrative requirements, rules of origin or predictability 
of the respective regimes are potential determinants of the choice between regimes.  
Thanks to leaner administrative procedure and simpler rules of origin, utilization rates of 
preferential treatment in developed countries have steadily improved in the past decade and are 
now at an average of 90 %; no data are available yet for the utilization of preferences granted by 
developing countries.  
It is often stated that preferences lower than 4 percentage points do not materialize in significant 
competitive advantages and lead to low preference utilization. On this last point, however, recent 
research shows that they may still matter below such threshold. Keck and Lendle (2012), using US 
import data, find that utilization rates remain often very high, even for very small preferential 
margins. Albeit the debate on the effectiveness of trade preference is an open one, some authors 
claiming that they may even be counterproductive, none of the arguments presented by critics is 
fully compelling. According to Bureau et al (2006), statistical results, often based on econometric 
simulations, are ambiguous. Measuring the actual of preference is an empirical debate due its 
statistical complexity. Disdier et al. (2013) develop a dedicated database for 1996 and 2006 and 
find that the impact on LDCs and non-emerging developing countries was more at the intensive 
margin than at the extensive one (export diversification).  Besides the empirical debate, the fact 
that preferences are generally fully utilised by exporters tend to suggest that these preferences 
have positive effects. 
Another constraint is that those preferences, even when fully utilized, may be counterbalanced by 
higher transaction and transportation costs that reduce LDCs' competitiveness. Trading involves a 
series of transaction costs — delays, documents and administrative fees — that increase domestic 
prices. When these costs are significantly higher than those of the competitors, as it is often the 
case in LDCs, they may lead to loss of market share or missed business opportunities.  These costs 
are part of the supply constraints that frequently reduce the international competitiveness of LDCs 
and limit their trade potential.  
The comparison of transaction costs confirms that LDCs face a comparative disadvantage when 
exporting goods (see low income countries in Table 8). According to UNCTAD data for 2005, 
CIF/FOB difference for Africa was 10 percent, compared to a world average of 6 %, UNCTAD 
(2007).  ECE (2003) reviews a series of transport cost studies for developing countries and 
conclude that a large part of the disadvantages faced by Southern Africa has to do with transport 
costs; this problem is particularly acute for landlocked countries. As mentioned by Djankov et al 
(2010), each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by more 
than 1%. The authors find also that delays are particularly damaging for time-sensitive goods, 
such as perishable agricultural products, which are of particular interest to LDCs as they are both 
labour intensive and high value-added 
 High international trade costs are usually correlated with poor inland transportation infrastructure 
which reduces not only the potential for international trade but also dampen the possibility for 
small producers in remote areas to tap the potential of regional markets. The issue is particularly 
acute for Sub-Saharan Africa (Buysa et al., 2010). but is also representative of the situation of 
many large LDCs,   
The problem, as we shall see later, is compounded when LDCs intend to diversify by joining global 
value chains; as delays in delivery and the necessity to maintain high inventory levels to cope with 
them run against the core management model of international supply chains, based on just-in-
time and minimum buffer stocks. Indeed, the issue was deemed serious enough for the WTO to 
devote its entire 4th Global Trade Review of Aid for Trade in July 2013 to the role of trade 
facilitation in helping LDCs joining global value chains (OECD-WTO, 2013).  
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Table 8: Logistics Performance Index by country grouping, 2012 
Country grouping a LPI b Customs Infrastructure International 
shipments 
Logistics 
competence 
Tracking & 
tracing 
Timeliness 
High income  3.55 3.36 3.56 3.28 3.5 3.65 3.98 
Upper middle income 2.82 2.49 2.54 2.86 2.71 2.89 3.36 
Lower middle income 2.59 2.23 2.27 2.66 2.48 2.58 3.24 
Low income   2.43 2.19 2.06 2.54 2.25 2.47 2.98 
 
Notes: a: According to World Bank specifications 
  b: Logistics Performance Index (LPI) is the weighted average of the country scores on the six key 
dimensions: Efficiency of the clearance process by border control agencies; Quality of trade and transport 
related infrastructure; Ease of arranging competitively priced shipments; Competence and quality of logistics 
services; Ability to track and trace consignments; Timeliness of shipments in reaching destination within the 
scheduled or expected delivery time. The index ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher score representing better 
performance. 
Source: 'Logistics Performance Index: Connecting to Compete 2012', World Bank. 
 
 
3  LDCs during the Great Trade Collapse 
The rapid increase in the total value of goods and services exported by LDCs during the 2000s 
came to an abrupt halt in 2008, in the wake of the global financial crisis. The sharp contraction in 
the world economy began with a financial crisis in developed countries in the second half of 2008. 
It worsened in the first quarter of 2009 as the subsequent collapse in demand in developed 
countries worked quickly its way through the global economy. The drying-up of trade finance 
resulting from shortages in global liquidity and increased risk aversion by major international 
banks was also a contributing factor to the trade collapse. Global trade contracted by 22.5% 
during 2009. Exports of developed economies fell by 22% while the decline for developing 
economies was 21%. 
Trade in consumer durables and capital goods was particularly affected by the financial situation, 
as their demand relies on credit. This segment of the world market is not of direct relevance for 
LDCs as exporters, but its collapse had important impact on the demand for primary inputs used in 
the production of such goods. Indeed, for LDCs, the main channel of contagion was through the 
price effect and the reversion of the upward trend that had boosted fuel and mineral prices since 
2003. Due to the dramatic fall in prices in the early stages of the crisis, the export sectors most 
affected were fuels and minerals. 11 The decline in prices was due to both financial factors, such as 
the sales of options by investment funds, and declines in the world demand for iron and steel, 
fuels and mineral ores. Nevertheless, as highlighted by ITC (2010), if oil is excepted, the 
specialization of LDCs on primary goods may have buffered the shock, as the purchase of those 
goods are less likely to be deferred unlike complex manufactured goods prevalent in developed 
countries and in some emerging ones. Indeed, according to ITC's indicators, all commodities 
exported by LDCs had maintained stable volumes (i.e, after discounting the drop in prices) during 
2009 relative to the previous year. 
The market for primary commodities, such as fuels and minerals, was one of the first to bounce 
back. Prices rose in the second and third quarters of 2009 due to increased demand from large 
emerging countries and speculative investments. Oil prices rose above US$70/barrel while the 
price of some minerals, such as copper, doubled. The prices of food and agriculture products 
decreased during the crisis, partly due to increases in production after a series of bad harvests in 
2007. Notably, the international prices of main food products remained low through the crisis thus 
helping deficit countries to mitigate the social cost of the crisis. Only a few exceptions, such as 
sugar, saw their prices increase in 2009. 
The behaviour of other export products was less dramatic. As far as LDC exports of clothing are 
concerned, specialization in the low-price range of products helped some LDC producers 
weathering the storm, as cash-constrained consumers in developed markets shifted to the 
cheapest options. Bangladesh was even able to increase its exports, albeit marginally, thanks to its 
diversified export partners; while Cambodia, which focused more on the US market, saw its 
                                               
11 Oil prices, that were over 100 dollar a barrel, plummeted to as low as US$ 40/b in early 2009. 
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exports decline. Drop in demand were mainly temporary and caused by retailers running down 
their stocks before placing new orders. All in all, Cambodia's exports of clothing dropped by 19% 
in 2009 compared with 2008; while Bangladesh's exports registered growth of 2% for the same 
period. Haiti, also dependent on the US market, saw its exports expanding by 20% in 2009; but 
this upward trend was short-lived, as most production facilities were damaged early January 2010 
by a catastrophic earthquake which led exports to stagnate in 2010. 
 
Chart 13: Quarterly evolution of LDCs merchandise exports, by major product groups, 
2008-2013 
(Index Q1/07 = 100)  
 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 
 
In summary, as shown in Chart 13, LDC exports of goods remained below their pre-crisis levels up 
to the first quarter of 2011. This underperformance is nevertheless, fully attributable to the 
exports of fuels and mining products, which never recuperated the high value observed 
immediately before the crisis. Exports of agricultural products were only slightly affected and 
resumed fairly quickly their upward trend, recovering as early as the last quarter of 2009 their 
pre-crisis value and continuing to expand up to the 3rd quarter of 2011. Exports of manufactures 
followed a similar trend, albeit with much more quarter-to-quarter variations.  
Trade in commercial services has been generally more resilient than trade in merchandise. 
However, transportation and – to a lesser extent – travel (which includes tourism expenditure) 
have been significantly affected. Based on the limited data available, mainly from OECD countries, 
trade in other commercial services has been less affected by the crisis. One of the reasons for the 
moderate decline in the demand for services is that services are not storable. While retailers and 
firms ran down their stocks during the initial phase of the downturn, the reduction in demand for 
services, especially business related services, was much less pronounced. Nevertheless, services 
related to trade in goods (transportation) have experienced similar declines to merchandise trade 
while financial services have been barely hit.  
All in all, the LDCs went through the 2008-2009 crisis reasonably well, considering the structural 
vulnerability of their economies and the extent of the global recession. In contrast to past crises 
and to other groups of countries in the world, growth remained positive for LDCs as a group and in 
two-thirds of individual LDCs (for a review, see Audiguier, 2012).  The Great Trade Collapse did 
not lead to a fall of LDCs' share in world trade in goods; rather the share increased from 1.04% in 
2008 to 1.10% in 2009, the share of LDCs in services trade also increased from 0.95% to 1.02%.  
This resilience of LDCs' trade in goods during the recession was mainly due to the positive 
orientation of their imports, while the market share for their exports saw slight decline. As a result, 
the LDC group recorded a large trade deficit in 2009, following three consecutive years of surplus 
(2006, 2007 and 2008). 
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Nevertheless, it is perhaps too optimistic to limit to the 2008-2009 period the effects of global 
crisis that resulted from the accumulation of financial stress in the US economy in 2007, leading to 
the bankruptcy of major US financial companies in September 2008. As documented in WTO's 
World Trade Report of 2012, the world economy in 2011 was plagued by a series of economic, 
political and natural shocks. The earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incident that hit Japan in March, 
sharply depressed the country's exports in the second quarter; while flooding in Thailand reduced 
the supply of key parts and components in the fourth quarter, further distorting global production 
networks. Political turmoil in North African countries hampered regional exports, especially in 
Libya, where oil production and exports plunged. Finally, the European economy was hit by the 
euro sovereign debt crisis, with negative impact on its economic growth and international trade. 
The impact of the euro crisis lasted up to mid-2013, when some signs of recuperation were 
observed, albeit fragile ones.  In the meantime, China and most other large emerging economies 
were revising downward their growth expectations. After rebounding in 2010 and 2011, world 
trade growth remained sluggish during 2012 and 2013, not growing much over 2% in real term. 
For the LDCs, the slower path of the world economy resulted in a second negative shock after the 
third quarter of 2011. The value of their total exports decreased continuously up to the last 
quarter of 2012, accumulating 17% reduction. The limited information available at the time of 
writing the paper could not indicate if the better results observed at the beginning of 2013 would 
be sustained. In the longer term, a bigger challenge to the export model that emerged in the 
2000s is the probable conclusion of the "super cycle" that kept the international prices of most 
commodities at historically high levels. The change in the main drivers of China's growth, in 
particular a reduction of public investment in infrastructure and heavy industry, may reduce 
demand for minerals and fuels, driving down prices of these commodities. The future of oil price is 
even more opaque, as the USA is becoming progressively self-sufficient thanks to the exploitation 
of new sources of gas. This reversal will/may catch the LDCs in a situation of renewed external 
vulnerability, as their trade balance has retuned into negative territory after the 2008-2009 crisis. 
In order to avoid returning to the boom-and-bust pattern that characterised their growth in the 
past, it is increasingly necessary for LDCs to diversify their exports into new (labour intensive) 
activities. This will be the subject of the next section. 
 
4  The Way Ahead: export Diversification and trade in tasks 
One classical determinant of trade performance for least-developed countries is product and 
market diversification. This strategy has more recently been enriched with the possibility of joining 
global production networks and exporting particular "tasks" rather than entire finished products. 
Trade in tasks and global value chains are among the important markers of international trade in 
the early 21st century, see Jara and Escaith (2012) for a non-technical review of the implications 
on global governance, trade policy and trade statistics.  This phenomenon has variously been 
called fragmentation, unbundling, offshoring, vertical specialization, slicing-up of the value-added 
chain or trade in tasks (see WTO's World Trade Report, 2008). By accelerating the transmission of 
technology and know-how, this trend contributed greatly to the rapid industrialization of emerging 
countries in the past 15 years. Actually, most of the East Asian miracle can be attributed to trade 
in tasks; and even China's rapid march towards industrialization relied on global supply chains (see 
WTO and IDE-JETRO, 2011).  
As discussed in Escaith (2013), the emergence of global production networks changed the way 
international specialization along comparative advantages is understood by economists, some of 
them adventuring into proclaiming that they are causing a paradigm change in trade theory 
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006).  Because production became modular and tasks 
outsourced, developing countries could create competitive industries focusing on a single segment 
of the whole industrial process, reaching international standards of quality and cost 
competitiveness without having to develop full-fledged industries.  
Old industrial policy based on import substitution, such as those defended by Prebish, relied on a 
large and growing highly protected domestic market. The chances of success of such inward-
oriented policies were extremely limited in the case of small developing countries because of the 
shallowness of the domestic market.  Thanks to global value chains, small developing countries are 
now able to integrate the international trade network by executing some of the tasks that were 
previously performed in a country.  Perhaps the most illustrative example is that of the island of 
Samoa, a least developed country according to UN classification, which was able to develop an 
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automotive industry despite its tiny size. In this island of about 200,000 people, Yazaki Samoa, a 
Japanese-owned company, produces automotive components for export to Australia. This plant 
employs more than 2,000 workers and makes up over 20% of the Island's manufacturing sector's 
total output. In Central America, Costa Rica, a small developing economy of less than 5 million 
inhabitants was able to develop internationally competitive IT and medical equipment industries.  
 
4.1  LDCs' trade in intermediates and global value chains  
One indirect indicator of insertion in these global production networks is the growing trade in 
intermediate inputs, derived from traditional trade statistics and filtering out the goods used for 
final consumption. 12 Most LDCs use imports of intermediate inputs in the production of final goods 
for domestic consumption. Primary product exporters, such as Angola, Yemen and Sudan, utilize 
imports of intermediate products as inputs for their extractive activities. There are, however, a 
number of LDCs that use imported intermediate inputs to produce processed goods for exports, 
thereby linking themselves vertically in the global value chain (Bangladesh, Cambodia or Lesotho 
as well as a few small island countries as Samoa or Haiti). Yet, with a few exceptions, connecting 
to global production network in order to benefit from these new opportunities is a formidable 
challenge for most LDCs. The usual points of entry for LDCs into global value chains are agro-food, 
clothing and tourism sectors. Nevertheless, as highlighted by WTO’s DG Pascal Lamy at the 4th 
Global Review of Aid for Trade: Connecting to Value Chains (WTO, 8-10 July 2013), in a new 
global world where connection to industrial networks is the key to industrialization, least developed 
countries are also the "least connected countries".   
With these caveats in mind, the overall picture is not negative when looking at the trend of 
intermediate goods imports. LDCs imports of such goods have increased from US$18 billion in 
2000 to US$87billion in 2012 which represents an average annual increase of 14% in comparison 
to the world average of 8% (Chart 14). Yet, trade in intermediate inputs is very heterogeneous 
within the LDC group (Chart 15). Bangladesh is by far the largest LDC importer of intermediates 
(US$21 billion in 2012, up from US$5 billion in 2000), followed by Angola (US$8 billion in 2012). 
Bangladesh alone accounted for 24% of LDCs total imports of intermediate goods in 2012. 
Chart 14: Imports of intermediate goods, 2000-2012 
(Index 2000 = 100)  
 
Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 Fuels are usually excluded from the analysis because they have dual use, either as intermediate 
goods – produce electricity or petrochemicals, or is used as final goods – for heating or transportation purpose. 
The dual use issue is also found in other products (light bulbs is just one example) and statisticians have to use 
heuristics to impute all or part of them either as final or intermediate goods. 
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Chart 15: Top LDC importers of intermediate goods, 2000-2012  
(Billion dollars) 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
 
 
4.1.1  Network and trade in value added statistics 
The statistics on trade in intermediate products permit to analyse a series of indicators that are 
specific to global production networks and trade in tasks. The first group of indicators is closely 
related to network analysis, a relatively recent field of research that focuses on measuring 
connectedness. The second family of indicators derives from input-output analysis applied to 
international sectoral transactions. The two approaches are different ways of analysing the same 
topological object (a graph, in its mathematical definition) using different tools. 
The network approach is interested in understanding how different vertices (countries, in our case) 
are connected in the network through edges (trade flows) and identify significant patterns. Without 
entering into details, visual representation of complex networks becomes rapidly cumbersome, but 
some important statistics allow characterising the main features of the network.  The paper applies 
some of these techniques to the evolution of LDCs' imports of intermediate goods and their 
exports of non-primary products between 2000 and 2011. 
The first set of graphs (16 and 17) look at the LDC network of suppliers of intermediate goods. 
Those goods are some of the key indicators of global value chains participation, because they show 
the upstream relationship of LDCs (where they get their inputs from).    
China is well known for being an importer of fuels and minerals produced by the developing 
countries, but Chart 17 indicates also the rise of China as a key supplier of intermediate inputs. 
EU27 remains the lead supplier of LDCs (many of them being in Africa); but its dominant position 
was much eroded between 2000 and 2011. Surprisingly, the USA is not such an important source 
of supply for LDCs, even in 2000. The Chart in 2011 looks also less “dense” than in 2000, which 
implies a better diversification of LDCs sources of supply (note that the Chart shows only flows 
representing 10% or more of each importers purchases). In this process, the role of some regional 
hubs (mainly in Africa, such as South Africa or Senegal) has been decreasing while the weight of 
others (India, Indonesia) is on the rise.  All in all, the main result remains a diversification of 
suppliers, which tend towards access to more competitive imported inputs. 
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Chart 16: Network of LDC suppliers of Intermediate Goods, 2000 
 
Note: Source of LDCs’ imports of intermediate goods (only flows representing more than 10% of each country’s 
imports; the higher the share, the darker the arrow). 
Source: Elaborated on the basis of UN COMTRADE data and BEC classification. 
 
Chart 17: Network of LDC suppliers of Intermediate Goods, 2011 
 
Notes and Source: see Chart 16 
South-North trade is more prevalent when it comes to LDCs export market of labour intensive 
products (food and manufactures) that are typically the result of GVCs. Charts 18 and 19 show the 
evolution of the destination of LDCs labour-intensive exports between 2000 and 2011. EU27 
remains the most important trade partner when it comes to absorbing this type of exports and 
USA’s role is also prominent.  
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Chart 18:  Main destination markets of LDCs Food and Manufacture products, 2000 
 
Note: LDCs’ exports of food and manufactures greater than 20% of respective national exports. Because the 
Chart highlights only top bilateral trade flows, a market of destination that absorbs a significant share of all 
LDCs exports may not appear despite being highly relevant from a systemic perspective. 
Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database. 
 Chart 19: Main destination markets of LDCs Food and Manufacture products, 2011 
 
Notes and Source: See Chart 18 
China’s role, though growing during the decade, remains secondary; while India appears as one of 
the main regional importers. The roles of Australia and Japan as markets are also increasing 
during the decade. It is important here to recall that the Charts represent shares of LDCs’ exports 
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and not absolute values: a lower weight does not imply a net reduction but may just reflect a 
trend towards more diverse geographical distribution. Another estimate of countries' and sectors' 
participation in global value chain is given by a new measure of trade called "trade in value 
added". Using inter-linked input-out matrices, the idea is to track down for each industry in each 
country the use of domestic and imported inputs, in order to estimate the foreign and domestic 
content of output, including exports, (see OECD and WTO (2012) for a technical presentation of 
the methodology and the data sources).  Building on their own experiences and the contribution of 
various national and international initiatives, OECD and WTO produced in January 2013 the first 
interactive world trade database (TiVA) specifically dedicated to trade in value-added. 13 Because 
TiVA is intensive in trade and structural data that need to be harmonized and made compatible 
between all countries, the coverage of LDCs is still very limited in the TiVA database, which is 
using only official data sources. At the time of writing this document, out of 57 countries, only one 
(Cambodia) was an LDC.  
As analysed in more details in WTO (2013b), 14 Cambodian exports of manufactures are 
concentrated on "clothing", by far the major manufacturing sector represented in LDC exports 
(60% of LDCs' manufactured products). The foreign value-added content in Cambodian exports of 
clothing, estimated at 63% in 2008 is much higher than what is observed for developing 
economies and the world average (around 25%). 15 This high share reflects the fact that LDCs 
usually insert themselves in GVCs thanks to their comparative advantage in terms of labour cost 
for assembling or processing imported intermediate components. This processing trade, typically 
done in "Export Processing Zones" relies on imported inputs to produce and export goods for lead 
foreign companies. It is interesting to compare Cambodia's situation with other developing 
countries that have been moving-up on the value-chain ladder which in 2008, 75% of their exports 
in "textiles and textile products, leather and footwear" were based on domestic value added. While 
most of the domestic value added of Cambodia's textiles and clothing exports were destined for 
final consumption, two-thirds of other developing countries exports where further processed in 
other countries, showing a deeper insertion as upstream suppliers in international supply chains. 
In order to fill some of the gaps in TiVA's coverage, UNCTAD paired with the Eora project to 
produce estimates of trade in value-added data for a large number of developing and Least-
developed countries. Unlike the OECD-WTO database, which relies on official statistics, Eora uses 
an algorithmic approach to fill data gaps when actual statistics are missing. Its primary objective 
was to study global environmental issues (for a review of the methodology, see Lenzen et al., 
2012).  As usual, when imputations are used instead of actual observations, the hypothesis behind 
the exercise is that the missing data can be extrapolated from the parameters estimated on other 
cases. This may or not be the case, especially when LDCs are only loosely inserted in the world 
economy and retain a strong socio-economic specificity.  
With this caveat in mind, the UNCTAD-Eora dataset that was developed for UNCTAD (2013), 
extends TiVA calculation to 187 countries. In the average of all sectors, the foreign content of 
LDCs exports is low (14%) and only half the world average (28%).16 The group of developing 
economies relies on foreign content for 25% of the value of its exports, a proportion that climbs to 
30% in East and South East Asia. Even though foreign value added in exports is not a full-fledged 
indicator of the GVC complexity of industries, as indicated by UNCTAD (2013), it remains that the 
countries which registered higher growth in exports in the past 15 years are also those which were 
able to increasingly access and process foreign inputs (WTO, 2013c).  Thus, while the old 
industrialization policy promoted by UNCTAD's founder R. Prebish was intended to build a domestic 
industrial base and shift away from primary products (i.e., from sectors of activity characterised by 
                                               
13 Mid-2013, the database coverage included 34 OECD and 23 non OECD economies, including the 
BRIICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) plus an estimate for the Rest 
of the World. The database is hosted by OECD at  www.oecd.org/trade/valueadded 
14 WTO (2013b) 
15 The "Foreign value added content of exports" corresponds to the inputs that were imported to 
produce the exported goods and services, net of any domestic content that could have been incorporated in 
the production of these inputs (or re-import of imbedded domestic value-added). 
16 It may be counter-intuitive to deplore the fact that the domestic content of export is too high, as 
promoting high domestic value-added exports seems the right thing to do. This paradox is only apparent; 
manufacture (often called "high value-added" activity when compared to primary or tertiary industries) is in 
fact characterized by low rate of added-value. Upstream industries (agriculture, mining) that rely less on inputs 
produced by other sectors have typically much higher value-added coefficients (up to 100% in the case of 
subsistence agriculture which does not use commercial inputs such as fertilizers or improved seeds). 
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a high value-added to output ratio) to manufactures (with lower rates of value-added); the new 
paradigm brought by GVCs may even push the recommendation further by stating that, in order to 
remain competitive and benefit from the most dynamic markets, it is important to source globally 
the inputs that the domestic industry requires. 
Nevertheless, LDC suppliers face significant obstacles at most stages for entering and then moving 
up the value chains. The result of an OECD-WTO survey on the main obstacles identified by private 
and public stakeholders when joining a GVC were presented at the 4th Global Review of Aid for 
Trade: Connecting to Value Chains (WTO, 8-10 July 2013). While value chains are inherently 
sector-specific, some cross-cutting conditions across sectors determine firms' abilities to 
economically upgrade and connect to value chains. 17 Among the main obstacles that LDC firms 
face in connecting to value chains, more than half of the partner countries identified inadequate 
domestic infrastructure as the foremost issue, followed by access to trade finance and compliance 
with SPS or technical standards. Support through better market access, feature high among LDC 
suppliers (identified as such in 73% of the responses to the survey) as well as among lead firms 
(44%). Lead firms cited trade facilitation measures (44%) as the most crucial area where support 
would be effective in bringing LDC suppliers into value chains. Other major areas of support cited 
are in labour force training (51% LDC suppliers) and improving public-private dialogue with 
national authorities (43% of lead firms). 
In the context of global value chains, where costs are only one factor of competitiveness to be 
complemented by just-in-time delivery and reduced logistic and transaction costs, trade facilitation 
is taking an increasing role in fostering export diversification. In contrast to the more traditional 
export-led policy, improving import efficiency is also an area that requires additional attention; 
since in a global production network, access to competitive imports is a key component of the 
trade strategy. As highlighted by the result of the 4th Global Review, too frequently aid-for-trade 
programmes fail to exhibit sufficient concerns about this dimension of competitiveness. But border 
facilitation is just one factor of the new policy equation. As highlighted by WTO(2011) and 
UNCTAD(2013), from the GVC perspective, investment and trade are inextricably intertwined and 
other behind-the-border considerations (often referred to as "WTO +" or "WTO X" measures  
governing market and investment behaviour, regional trade agreements, intellectual property 
regime and business facilitation policies) become particularly relevant. Moreover, as highlighted in 
Milberg and Winkler (2013), insertion in GVCs is not a risk-free panacea; in an insiders’ market 
characterised by quasi-monopolistic organizations, competitive advantages may shift as well as 
lead-firms' strategies.  
 
5  Conclusions 
A perceptible shift in LDC trade has taken place in the past decade, thanks to the rebalancing of 
global demand towards large emerging countries and the resulting long-lasting cycle of high 
international commodity prices. This process led to the apparently conflicting results of wider 
geographical diversification of LDCs' exports; while contributing to a deeper specialization of these 
exports on a few basic commodities. The latter is most entirely due to a price effect and should, 
therefore, not be understood as a reversal towards highly specialised production structure. Indeed, 
trade statistics show some successful example of diversification in labour-intensive activities, such 
as textiles and clothing and in services, particularly tourism.  
From a quantitative perspective, the picture is positive in both absolute and relative terms. The 
LDCs' total exports of goods and commercial services registered an annual average growth of 
15.5% between 2000 and 2012; higher than other developing economies whose corresponding 
exports increased on average by 12% per year during this period.   
                                               
17 The 2013 monitoring exercise conducted by OECD and WTO was based on self-assessments from 80 
developing countries, 28 bilateral donors, 15 multilateral donors, and nine providers of South-South 
cooperation. Views were also received from 524 supplier firms in developing countries and 173 lead firms, 
mostly in OECD countries. The survey looks also into sector-specific issues with respect to the following 
industries: agro-food production, tourism, textiles and apparel, information and communication technology, 
transport and logistics. 
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Diversification away from minerals and fuels to labour-intensive products such as agriculture, 
textile and clothing has been supported for many years by preferential market access to developed 
countries. More recently, emerging countries have also been granting such preferences to LDCs 
product. Despite the worldwide trend of lowering external tariffs through MFN or regional 
preferential treatment that gradually erodes LDCs margin of preferences, a closer analysis reveals 
that these countries still benefit from significant preferences, in particular in agriculture.  
Notwithstanding some progress in market and product diversification, LDCs remain particularly 
vulnerable. With the exception of 2006-2008, the LDCs as a group have systematically recorded a 
trade deficit. Moreover, the overall picture reflects a deep heterogeneity in the situation of 
individual countries. Fuel exporters record persistent trade surpluses while the non-fuel LDC 
exporters continue with systemic and growing trade deficits. In the last 12 years, non-fuel 
exporters' trade deficit increased by 14% per year on average; while the surplus of fuel exporters 
grew by 18%. Non-fuel exporters LDCs have to resort to external resources to finance their trade 
deficits as their income from their merchandise exports covers no more than 57% of their 
merchandise imports. The situation is particularly acute for LDCs that specialize in agricultural 
exports, as only one third of the merchandise import bills can be financed through foreign 
exchange earned from their merchandise exports. Even mineral exporters are not capable of 
financing their imports; despite the favourable prices exports of these resource-rich countries 
enjoyed in recent years. 
The 2008-2009 global crisis and the bumpy recovery that followed illustrate the fragility of the 
recent trends. A slowdown in the growth of large emerging countries and a more inward oriented 
economic policy in China may put an end to the unprecedented commodity "super-cycle" that lifted 
the value of LDCs exports since 2003. This may reduce the appetite of investors for launching new 
extractive projects in LDCs endowed with abundant fuel and mineral resources, even if demand for 
those commodities are expected to remain high. Persistent high prices of fuel will, on the other 
hand, continue to weigh on the import bill of non-fuel exporting LDCs. In such a perspective, 
renewed efforts towards extensive product diversification are called for.  
The rapid development of international production networks as part of the new business models of 
global value chains offers new opportunities for export diversification. Because the activities focus 
on a small part of the value-chain and is often developed in cooperation with lead firms, this new 
form of industrialisation is less demanding in terms of domestic financial resources and 
autonomous industrial and management capacities than more traditional industrial policies.  This 
specific characteristic is particularly relevant for alleviating the supply-side constraints that limit 
LDCs' export diversification. On the other hand, competition is fierce and GVC participation cannot 
materialize without a proper conducive environment. For many LDCs, one of the main obstacles for 
joining GVCs remains deficiencies in trade and transport facilitation which entail high cost for 
importing the necessary inputs and exporting the processed goods. Active trade facilitation 
programmes, such as those identified during the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade in July 
2013 offer new options to LDCs for joining GVCs. For those, like Bangladesh or Cambodia, that 
have already been able to join these global production network, up-grading towards higher "value-
added" activities requires more encompassing horizontal policies.   
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7. Annex:  Least Developed Countries EConomic Heterogeneity 
The classification of a country as LDC is taken by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP), a 
United Nations body. The initial (1971) criteria included a low per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) and structural impediments to growth, such as a small share of manufacturing in total GDP 
and a low literacy rate. The criteria have been refined over the years. The following criteria are 
currently used to classify countries as least developed: Gross national income per capita; Human 
Assets Index; Economic Vulnerability Index. In addition, some absolute size threshold is taken into 
consideration; a country with population larger than 75 million inhabitants may not be eligible 
despite having low per capita income (Bangladesh and Ethiopia are the two exceptions).  
More generally, LDCs can be identified as developing countries which have not achieved a 
significant degree of industrialization, suffer from low income and standards of living and high 
population growth. They are also vulnerable to external shocks, due to their predominantly 
agricultural economy and their external dependence on a few commodity exports. Despite these 
common features, LDCs do not conform a homogeneous block of countries, either because of their 
geographical location (many LDCs are in Africa) or singularities (small islands or landlocked 
countries) or export specialization (from oil to light manufacture).  
Export specialization presents a special interest from the perspective of this document. The 
objective of this Annex is to look at some of the inter-country specificities of LDCs according to this 
criterion. The data used in the analysis covers structural indicators ranging from gross domestic 
product, external vulnerability and Human Development Indices and were selected to reflect the 
basic philosophy of the LDC concept:  
 Export specialization (Agriculture, Fuels, etc.) based on WTO classification. 
DEMO: Average annual population growth rate (%) in the 2000s;  
Y_CAP: 2010 GDP per capita (at 2005 PPP $ prices);  
dGDP: Annual % GDP growth from 2000 to 2008 (last year before the global crisis);  
Pop and DEMO: Population (million) and population %growth (2010 or closest year);  
HDI: UNDP's 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) value;  
SCHO: 2010 Mean years of schooling (adults);  
ODA: Net ODA received (% of GNI, 2010);  
EVI: FERDI's Economic Vulnerability Index (2008);  
SPEC: FERDI's Specialization index (2008) 
XINST: FERDI's Export Instability index (2008).  18 
 
Words of caution are called for at this stage: because the panels are greatly unbalanced (ranging 
from 4 observations in the case of diversified exporters to 17 for agriculture), results are only 
indicative and most probably contingent to the selected sample and influenced by outliers. In other 
words, the results are most probably not robust to changes in measurement or sampling size.   
A discriminant analysis was performed on a selection of 44 LDCs for which data were available. 
The first step was to see how the above-mentioned variables interacted, using a variant of 
Principal Component Analysis (Annex Figure 1). In this graph, variables tend to cluster according 
                                               
18 For the vulnerability and shock indices developed by the Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur 
le Développement International, see Cariolle, J. (2011).  
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to their positive correlation; symmetrically, high values of a given variable will be negatively 
correlated with variables or observations located in the opposite quadrant. The stronger the 
explanatory/discriminant power of a variable (its capacity to split the LDC group into separate 
clusters), the further they are from the gravity centre of the graph and the closer from the unit 
circle, representing the maximum correlation with one axis. 19  
The correlation of each variable with the principal components (the axes) provides clues for their 
interpretation. For example, economic growth is closely correlated with the positive side of the 
horizontal axis while ODA is correlated with the negative side. This indicates that fast-growing 
countries will tend to be on the right side of the graph and that slow-growing countries (on the 
left) are more likely to receive high level of ODA in relation to their GDP.  
LDC heterogeneity: Principal component analysis of selected discriminant variables, 
2008-2012 
 
 
 
Notes: according to sources, variables correspond to 2008, 2010 or 2012. 
Sources: see text.  
 
The overall Human Development Index is close to the barycentre of the graph, indicating that it is 
not a discriminatory variable in the present case. Indeed, if high income and high-growth variables 
are located to the left of the horizontal axis, which explains 67% of the total variance observed in 
the LDCs, years of schooling in the adult population, which is both a social development index and 
an indicator of investment in human capital, is located at the left-hand side of the axis. 
Vulnerable countries (high EVI) that present, inter alia, export specialization and instability (SPEC 
and XINST) tend also to have high rate of demographic growth. Nevertheless, those countries are 
also generally small in terms of population (Pop). Official assistance (ODA) variable is located in 
the North-West quadrant of the graph, indicating that it tends to go to the poor and vulnerable 
countries. 
The second step was to classify LDCs according to their export specialization and see how each 
category performed according to the variables (Annex Table 1). Income per capita is one of the 
most unevenly distributed variable between classes (its coefficient of variation is 200%). Oil 
exporters benefit from an income close to US$ 7,000 per habitant, 6 times more than mineral or 
manufacture exporters. Oil exporters were also the top performers in terms of economic growth 
                                               
19 By construction, axes are linearly independent: if one variable has a perfect correlation with one axis, 
its correlation will be 0 with the other ones. 
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from 2000 to 2008, last year before the global crisis. In other words, income differentials tended 
to increase rather than converge.   
Yet Human Development Index, which takes qualitative as well as economic variables into 
consideration, shows that the oil exporters are not able to build on the economic income to 
improve the welfare of their population. The HDI index is almost uniformly low across the classes.  
(its coefficient of variation is 20%). 
As expected, being a manufacturer exporter reduces external and systemic vulnerability (XINST 
and EVI). The manufacture exporters show higher grade of demographic maturity (indicated by a 
relatively low rate of population growth) and higher investment in human capital (accumulated 
years of schooling in the adult population). At the difference of oil producers, mineral exporters 
were apparently not able to build on the commodity super-cycle of the 2000s, which lifted the 
international price of raw material. Even if their rate of growth was somewhat higher than the 
average, they suffer from high demographic expansion and low investment in human capital. 
Export specialization and main structural indicators (2008-2010) 
 
Specialization DEMO Y_CAP HDI SCHO ODA dGDP Pop EVI SPEC XINST Obs. 
Agriculture 2.5         1,503  0.4 4.2 27.7 10.5 11.1 49.8 54.8 42.4 17 
Diversified 2.3         2,616  0.5 4.4 12.7 10.4 4.6 49.4 32.3 36.1 4 
Manufacture 1.6         1,305  0.5 5.0 12.3 10.3 39.0 36.3 34.5 28.2 6 
Minerals 2.6         1,169  0.4 3.3 14.2 13.4 19.3 40.1 48.3 35.9 10 
Oil 2.4         6,762  0.5 3.3 3.9 23.2 20.6 47.7 57.8 63.4 7 
All LDCs  2.4         2,338  0.4 4.0 17.4 13.1 17.7 45.4 49.0 41.8 44 
Coef. Var. 0.3 2.0 0.2 0.5 1.6 0.5 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 … 
 
Note: Data, collected from various sources, deal with the period 2008-2010 (see text for measurement units). 
Sources: FERDI, UNDP, World Bank, WTO.  
 
Finally, the discriminant analysis looked at the most relevant structural variables able to "explain" 
the classification of countries according to their export specialization.  Considering the limits of our 
sample, the resulting classification function is barely representative and, for this reason, will not be 
discussed in details. Perhaps the sole valuable information of this last exercise was to indicate the 
within-class homogeneity, as measured by the percentage of countries correctly reclassified on the 
basis of the score they obtained for the classification function. On this criterion, only the oil 
exporters' classification was fully "explained" (all these countries were correctly reclassified). 
Manufacture exporters were also relatively homogeneous (83% of correct classification). At the 
contrary, barely more than half of the agricultural exports were adequately reclassified. The score 
for mineral exporters was no much better (60%), showing also a large heterogeneity. Indeed, 
many agricultural exporters were reclassified as mineral exporters by the classification function. 
The score for "diversified" exporters is 75% (3 well identified, out of a total of 4 countries for this 
category). 
 
__________ 
